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ARNOLD’S 


INVASION OF VIRGINIA. 


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BY FRANCIS RIVES LASSITER, 

Of Petersburg , Virginia. 






Reprinted from the “Sewanee Review.” 
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1901. 






































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ARNOLD’S INVASION OF VIRGINIA. 


During the closing days of 1780 Thomas Jefferson, Gov¬ 
ernor of Virginia, enjoyed no sinecure. On November 25 
the English general, Leslie, had terminated his forty days’ 
occupation of the Chesapeake, in obedience to the order of 
Cornwallis to reenforce that general in South Carolina. The 
four thousand Virginian militia, who had hurriedly assembled 
under Muhlenberg at Portsmouth, had been marched back 
to Petersburg and disbanded by the Governor’s order. 1 2 Of 
the one thousand so-called “regulars” that Muhlenberg 
had painfully collected, Steuben, who assumed military com¬ 
mand on December 3, had sent about four hundred under 
Col. Greene to join the Southern army. Not, alas, until the 
influence of Muhlenberg, together with the appeals of Cols. 
Harrison 8 and Greene, had alone prevented a mutiny of of¬ 
ficers and men. The remainder had been returned to Ches¬ 
terfield C. H., while Steuben writes: 3 “The business now 
before me is to get clothes for those wretches at Chester¬ 
field. They amount to between five and six hundred; but 
they are so utterly naked that, except I can get some clothes 
for them, they will all be sick before they can be ordered to 
march.” 

The reenforcement of Greene in the Carolinas was the 
chief object of executive effort. The broad patriotism of 
Jefferson united with the military insight of Steuben in dicta¬ 
ting this course. The conquest by Cornwallis of Georgia 
and the Carolinas meant the transfer of the seat of war to 
the soil of Virginia. It meant not only the ravages of hos¬ 
tile armies, but diminished power to resist. Experience else¬ 
where had shown a disorganized militia unwilling to leave 
their families unprotected on the route of the invader. It 


1 Muhlenberg’s “Life of Muhlenberg.” 

2 Charles Harrison, a brother of Benjamin Harrison, of Berkeley, the 
signer of the Declaration of Independence. 

3 Muhlenberg, p. 220. 




4 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 

meant also hundreds of recruits to the king’s standard from 
the reconquered colonies, many of whom waited only to take 
up arms the moment that cause seemed successful. Clin¬ 
ton’s return of his forces already justified Lord Germaine in 
declaring that “the American levies in the king’s service 
are more than the whole of the enlisted troops in the service 
of the Congress.” 4 

As the year closes the General Assembly is in session ; and 
if we may believe contemporary letters, Mr. Cleveland was 
not the first American Executive who found a legislative 
body “ a team of wild horses on his hands.” “As Christ¬ 
mas approaches,” writes Richard Henry Lee, “ so does the 
anxiety for getting home, and it remains a doubt whether 
the House can be kept together when the holidays come 
on.” 5 

The first question was naturally how to raise the State’s 
quota of continental troops, afterwards how to arm and equip 
them. The militia was the basis of our military establish¬ 
ment, of which the number enrolled was, according to Mr. 
Jefferson (writing in 1781), forty-nine thousand nine hun¬ 
dred and seventy-one. Individually the Virginian militiaman 
possessed the raw qualities of which soldiers are made; col¬ 
lectively, the Virginian militia was unorganized, undisci¬ 
plined, poorly armed, wasteful, and in the military sense un¬ 
reliable. 

At this period of the struggle six years of war had some¬ 
what tempered the spirit of military enthusiasm. Volun¬ 
teering had practically ceased. Promises of pensions and 
bounties had long failed to bring recruits, even for short en¬ 
listments. Bounties had been increased, and imperfect laws 
for a so-called draft had been in operation since the session 
of October, 1778. Still the moderate requirements of the 
Federal Congress were not complied with in any of the 
States. 

In the critical state of our affairs just indicated, repeated 
recommendations from Congress, from Gen. Washington,. 

4 Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy. Germaine to Clinton , March 7, 1781. 

5 Bland Papers, II., 40-44. 



5 


Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 

» 

and from Gen. Greene, finally induce the General Assembly 
of Virginia to more stringent action, and on December 15, 
1780, Richard Henry Lee 6 announces to Theoderick Bland 
in Congress the passage of an act to raise three thousand 
men for the war by $12,000 bounty in hand, together with 
three hundred acres and an able-bodied negro at the end of 
the war. “ If this does not answer, a draft is to take place.’’ 
But as the year draws to its close, the savage is added to the 
civilized foe and domestic disorganization. The Cherokees 
in the southwest have for some time been engaging the at¬ 
tention of the Governors of Virginia and North Carolina. 
A more dangerous enemy now appears on the Ohio border. 
During the last days of December Mr. Jefferson is engaged 
in preparing that blow which, delivered by George Rogers 
Clarke, is to negative forever the savage claim of title to the 
lands of our Northwestern Territory, and banish the scalp¬ 
ing knife and the tomahawk from the haunting dreams of 
settlers’ wives. 

On Christmas day Jefferson writes to Clarke detailed in¬ 
structions for his expedition toward Detroit and the Lake 
Erie country. He gives him the Illinois battalion, Col. 
Crockett’s battalion, and Maj. Slaughter’s corps, while swift 
riders are carrying orders to the county lieutenants 7 of Fay¬ 
ette, Lincoln, Jefferson, Ohio, Monongalia, Berkeley, Hamp¬ 
shire, Frederick, and Greenbrier. 

While Jefferson and Virginia are thus preoccupied, Sir 
Henry Clinton at New York receives a letter from Col. Bal¬ 
four in South Carolina addressed to Gen. Leslie at Ports¬ 
mouth, which had hastened this latter general’s departure 
for the South. A somewhat sensational statement 8 in this 
letter as to the condition of Cornwallis’s affairs determines 
Clinton to aim another blow at Virginia. Brig. Gen. Bene¬ 
dict Arnold was intrusted with this service, a fact that after¬ 
wards furnished a perhaps not unneeded spur to patriotic re¬ 
sistance. 


6 Bland Papers, II., 40. 

7 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, December 24, 1780. 

8 Clinton to Cornwallis, December 13, 1780. 



6 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 

On December n Arnold began to embark, and by the 
20th lay within Sandy Hook with about sixteen hundred 
men, 9 comprising the Eightieth Regiment (Scotch or Edin¬ 
burgh Royal Volunteers, Lieut. Col. Dundas), the Queen’s 
Rangers (Lieut. Col. Simcoe), Arnold’s regiment, and two 
provincial battalions. His transports also carried four hun¬ 
dred bridles and saddles to equip four troops of horse in 
Virginia, and a number of large cannon. 10 

Lieut. Col. Simcoe mentions a circumstance that I think 
due Arnold to repeat, that on the 20th of December Gen. 
Arnold issued an order, to use his own words, “ against 
depredations in the country where the expedition was bound 
to, and iri the most forcible terms and strongest manner called 
upon the officers to second his intentions and the commander 
in chief’s orders in this respect.” 11 

Included within the general purpose of diverting the re¬ 
sources of Virginia from Greene’s army in South Carolina, 
Clinton’s orders to Arnold defined two specific objects. 1 ' 2 
Arnold was ordered either to strike at the general depot of 
supplies for the Southern army at Petersburg, which his 
chief declared he still had reason to think was considerable; 
or, failing that, to take and fortify a post at Portsmouth, both 
for the purpose of a naval station for the British fleet and for 
assembling the loyalist inhabitants. To collect large num¬ 
bers of loyal subjects was always a favorite dream of the 
Home Ministry, and indeed of Clinton, though the officers 
in the field entertained few illusions on the subject. As 
Nathaniel Greene wrote in 1778, so it continued to be truer 
“ The limits of the British government in America are their 
out-sentinels.” 13 It was also strongly recommended to 
Cornwallis 12 not to break up the post at Portsmouth if again 
established, the experience of the few loyalists who had de¬ 
clared for the king upon Leslie’s arrival and been left un- 

9 Washington to Rochambeau, January 3, 1781. 

10 Scot’s Magazine, 1781, p. 21. 

11 Simcoe’s Journal, p. 159. 

12 Clinton to Cornwallis, December 13, 1780. 

13 G. W. Greene, “Life of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Greene.” Volume II.,. 
p. 2. 



Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 7 

protected upon his withdrawal having been somewhat dis¬ 
couraging to further enterprise in that direction. 

It will be seen that though the stores at Petersburg escaped 
destruction, incalculably more exhaustive was the wasteful 
system of militia defense; and that the naval station finally 
established at Yorktown became, with no fault on Clinton’s 
part, a cul-de-sac more fatal than the Caudine Forks. 

Scarcely had Arnold begun to embark in New York har¬ 
bor when Washington, ever watchful and untiring, is in¬ 
formed by spies of the approximate numbers and probable 
southward destination of the force. This news he imme¬ 
diately conveys both to Steuben 14 and Jefferson, and on De¬ 
cember 13, ever hopeful of French naval cooperation, writes 
also to Rochambeau. 15 

Gen. Washington was scarcely the man to cry “ Wolf! ” 
Under most circumstances, information deemed by him im¬ 
portant enough for communication should have seemed to 
Mr. Jefferson sufficiently interesting for him to direct inves¬ 
tigation, if not immediate action. 

Preoccupied with other matters, as we have seen, neither 
Jefferson nor Steuben seems to have made any plans for ob¬ 
taining information of the approach of an enemy by sea, 
much less any preparation for resistance upon such an ar¬ 
rival. 

No lookout boats observed the outer waters, and the ves¬ 
sels of the Virginian navy, which an act 16 of the current legis¬ 
lature required to be always patrolling the Chesapeake, seem 
to have been about the dockyard, for the most part un¬ 
manned and out of commission. 

On the 21st the expedition of fifty vessels sailed from 
Sandy Hook, was dispersed by a violent gale, and reassem¬ 
bled on the 26th and 27th off the Capes of Virginia. On 
December 29 twenty-seven vessels arrived in the Chesa¬ 
peake. By the 30th the fleet had assembled, lacking three 
transports, one armed vessel, and about four hundred troops. 17 

14 Washington to Steuben, December io, 1780. 

15 Washington to Rochambeau, December 13, 1780. 

16 Hening’s Statutes at Large, Volume X., 377. 

17 Rivington’s New York Gazette (Extraordinary), February 3, 1781. 



8 


Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

Having captured some small merchant vessels in Hampton 
Roads, which facilitated the transportation of his troops, 
Arnold did not wait for his absent vessels. With the same 
impetuosity that characterized his advance on Quebec in 
1 775, recalling doubtless how nearly that bold dash had 
brought him to brilliant success, he pushed up James River 
against the wind and without waiting for tides. Opposite 
Williamsburg, Arnold debated whether he should strike that 
place; but the wind hauling in his favor shortly afterwards, 
he proceeded, and was detained for the first time at Hood’s 
late in the afternoon of the 3d of January. 

At Hood’s (now called Old Fort Powhatan) a few pieces 18 
mounted on an uninclosed earthwork were manned by about 
fifty militiamen. One of the vessels of the fleet having ac¬ 
cidentally passed the fort with the loss of one man, the place 
was promptly evacuated upon a demonstration against its 
rear by a landing party under Simcoe. Dismounting the 
guns that evening, the troops reembarked in the morning, 
aud before noon on the 4th disembarked at Westover. A 
hurried council of war discussed the country reports as to 
the force being collected in opposition, Arnold's orders pos¬ 
itively forbidding any operations partaking of too much risk. 
After calculating his chances, the bold adventurer concluded 
to make a single day’s march toward the magazines of Rich¬ 
mond, as well for obtaining more perfect information as for 
delivering any blow he might be able to strike. 

Accordingly, with less than eight hundred men, at two 
o’clock on the 4th, Arnold marches from Westover, protect¬ 
ing himself by an advance guard under Simcoe. He 
camps for the night at Four Mile Creek, twelve miles from 
Richmond, and at one o’clock on the 5th occupies the town, 19 

18 Rivington’s New York Gazette (Extraordinary), February 3, 1781, says 
that Hood’s was defended by three eighteen-pounders, one twenty-four- 
pounder, and one eighteen-inch howitzer. Scot’s Magazine , 1781, says, more 
credibly, an eight-inch howitzer. Steuben writes to Gen. Greene, January 
8, 1781, mentioning only two iron ten-pounders and a brass howitzer. 

19 Richmond at this period contained less than three hundred houses' 
“There was hardly room for the members of the legislature and the officers 
of the State.” “Richmond: the Capital of Virginia.” (John P. Little, 1851.) 



Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 9 

pushing forward Simcoe with his Rangers, horse and foot, 
and the flank companies of the Eightieth Regiment to de¬ 
stroy the foundry, the boring mill, the magazine, and other 
buildings about Westham, seven miles higher up the river. 

It is unnecessary to describe the details of the advance by 
the Darbytown Road, nor the maneuvers between Almond 
Creek and Gillis Creek to flank the two hundred militia who 
alone had been collected for the defense of the capital. Ar¬ 
nold told Simcoe that they wouldn't fight, and the truth is it 
would have been folly to attempt it. It is sufficient to say 
that throughout the advance of thirty-three miles not a gun 
was fired, and the invader found no obstacles more serious 
than a few broken bridges on the country road. 

Having accomplished his designs of the day before, and ap¬ 
prehensive of being cut off from his shipping, Arnold in¬ 
tended to return early in the morning of the 6th; but so 
wearied were many of his men by their exertions, especially 
in destroying five or six tons of powder at Westham, that he 
was forced to delay his march. During this morning (the 
6th) several other buildings were destroyed by fire, and, ex¬ 
cept in consideration of the poverty of the government, an 
inconsiderable quantity of public and private stores, prin¬ 
cipally rum, salt, and leather. Though Richmond was a 
mere village at the time, it seems certain from contemporary 
accounts that Lossing, Sloane, and other writers have exag¬ 
gerated the injury inflicted upon that place by this incur¬ 
sion. 20 Some of Arnold’s soldiers, finding rum, increased 
his disorganization, so that when he began to retire about 
noon in a driving rain and over wet roads, an opportunity 
for a brilliant retaliatory stroke was presented, especially 
after darkness set in. No active hand was ready to deal the 
blow, and he arrived safely at Westover on the 7th, carrying 
with him three hundred sadly missed muskets and five brass 
four-pounders. 

We left Mr. Jefferson on Christmas day busied with the 
details of Clarke’s expedition to the Northwest. Early in 

20 Virginia. Gazette, January 13, 1781. Jefferson to Washington, January 
io, 1781. Cf. Gordon and Lossing. 



io Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

the morning of Sunday, the last clay of the old year, Gen. 
Nelson breaks in upon his excellency’s well-earned rest with 
a letter from Mr. Jacob Wray, of Hampton—“ from a private 
hand,” as Mr. Jefferson says. No officer of government, 
but Mr. Jacob Wrajr, of Hampton, first sounds the alarm. 
Mr. Wray says that twenty-seven sail were in the Roads 
just below Willoughby Point in the morning of Decem¬ 
ber 29. After hasty conference Gen. Nelson is sent off 
to the lower country “ with full powers,” Capt. Maxwell of 
the navy is written to, and orders given for stationing ex¬ 
presses to Hampton. 

No other steps are taken, Mr. Wray not having been care¬ 
ful to state whether the sail were “ friends or foes.” Steu¬ 
ben had no illusions on this subject, and two officers sent 
by him down the south side of the river were not instructed 
to inquire as to this point. 21 Beyond reporting Mr. Wray’s 
letter to the General Assembly and sending to Petersburg 
for one hundred stand of arms, nothing is done on Monday, 
the 1st. 

On the 2d, at ten o’clock in the morning, a letter from Na¬ 
thaniel Burwell, county lieutenant of James City, confirms 
at last the hostile character of the fleet, and reports that they 
have advanced to Warrasqueake Bay (about what is now 
called Mulberry Point). 

Arnold had then been beating against a head wind for four 
days in the waters of Virginia, and Mr. Jefferson writes to 
Nelson that Mr. Wray’s intelligence “had become totally dis¬ 
believed.” 22 

Everything is now activity. There is no embodied force 
except Steuben’s still naked conscripts at Chesterfield C. H. 
Steuben asks for four thousand militia, and Mr. Jefferson 
writes: “We mean to have four thousand six hundred militia 
in the field.” 22 

The assembly, who have been “kept together” through 
the holidays, rise on the 2d after the news has been commu- 


21 Steuben to Washington, January 8, 1781. 
22 Jefferson to Nelson, January 2, 1781. 



Arnold s Invasion of Virginia. ir 

nicated, and furnish, according to the idea of the Executive, 
an economical, if not a speedy, body of couriers. 

Accordingly on the 2d a circular letter is delivered to the 
delegates addressed to the county lieutenants of Henrico, 
Hanover, Goochland, Fluvanna, Albemarle, Amherst, Ches¬ 
terfield, Powhatan, Cumberland, Dinwiddie, Amelia, Buck¬ 
ingham, Bedford, Halifax, Charlotte, Prince Edward, Lunen¬ 
burg, Mecklenburg, Sussex, Southampton, and Brunswick 
calling for one-half of their respective militia; and to the 
same officers of Shenandoah, Rockingham, Augusta, and 
Rockbridge demanding a thousand riflemen of the moun¬ 
tains. 

“That there may not be a moment’s delay, let them come 
in detached parties,” though he has to add, “bringing arms 
if they have them.” 23 

Lieut. Reid, 24 at Brunswick C. H., is also ordered to bring 
his troop to Petersburg and a new authority is forwarded to 
Nelson 25 to call on the lower militia as he thinks proper. Of 
the Continentals at Chesterfield C. H., only one hundred 
and fifty are fit for duty. Steuben orders them to Peters¬ 
burg to cover stores, at the same time ordering the stores to 
be removed. Though on the afternoon of the 3d the enemy 
are reported at Jamestown, the correspondence of that day 
shows only the appointment of Mr. John Brown as commis¬ 
sioner under the act for procuring provisions, and a letter to 
Col. Skillern, saying that light horse cannot be armed. 
“ The late invasions have left us unfurnished with swords and 
pistols.” On the morning of the 4th Steuben, knowing that 
the fleet is at Westover, is satisfied that Richmond is their 
object. Attempting to raise a force to check their progress* 
he can assemble only one hundred men. These he sends 
under Maj. Dick with orders to fire at them from every favor¬ 
able location; but, to use the General’s own words, “ These 
orders were, however, badly executed.” 26 

23 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, Circular, January 2, 1781. 

24 Idem, Jefferson to Reid, January 2, 1781. 

^Idem, Jefferson to Nelson, January 2, 1781. 

26 Steuben to Washington, January 8, 1781. 



12 


Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 


At five o’clock in the afternoon of the 4th the enemy are 
known to be drawn up at Westover at 2 p.m. of the same 
day; and hurried orders goto Henrico, Hanover, Goochland, 
Powhatan, and Chesterfield “ for every man of your county 
able to bear arms” 27 to rendezvous at Westham. 

In a similar letter of the same date to Col. Banister (at 
Petersburg), county lieutenant of Dinwiddie, the disorgan¬ 
ization of the time is most plainly apparent. Col. Banister is 
informed that he can arm his men from certain wagons loaded 
with arms at Chesterfield C. H., “ under orders to proceed 
to Powhatan C. H.” 

After doing what he could to remove stores 28 from Rich¬ 
mond, Petersburg, Chesterfield C. H., and Westham, Steu¬ 
ben ordered his battalion of one hundred and fifty Continen¬ 
tals to meet their naked brothers opposite Westham, and in 
the evening “thought it prudent” to retire to Manchester. 

Col. Taylor, at Winchester, is ordered to move the pris¬ 
oners of the Saratoga convention to Maryland; and the Gov¬ 
ernor, having done everything a civilian patriot could think of 
doing, “ went to Tuckahoe and lodged.” 29 

Early on the 5th Mr. Jefferson is at Westham superintend¬ 
ing the work of removal of arms and ammunition, which 
the day before he had ordered to be carried on all night. He 
then goes to Manchester, sees the enemy at a distance, fails 
to meet Steuben, whom he had expected at Chetwood’s, and, 
mounting a fresh horse, proceeds in the afternoon to Col. 
Fleming’s, for “quarters.” 29 Unfortunately, he failed to 
meet also some three hundred militia who had reached West¬ 
ham on their way down, but dispersed upon intelligence of 
the enemy’s approach, though arms were being brought over 
the river for their use. 30 

On the 6th, when so much might have been done, Mr. Jef- 

27 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, Circular, January 4, 1781. 

28 “Of their artillery, I secured myself five pieces which were mounted; 
the rest, . . . three brass and a number of iron pieces, fell into the ene¬ 

my’s hands.” Steuben to Washington, January 8, 1781. 

29 Jefferson’s Diary, 1781. 

80 Steuben to Washington, January 8, 1781. 



Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 13 

ferson, after going to Westham for “books and papers,” 29 re¬ 
tires to his family at Fine Creek, in Powhatan. 

In the morning Steuben collects three hundred and fifty 
men and two pieces of artillery, prepared to dispute the pas¬ 
sage of the river at Manchester, but the enemy retiring as 
they had come, he marches in the evening of the 6th to War¬ 
wick for the defense of flour and grain stored there. 

Meanwhile Nelson, also with three hundred and fiftymen, 
is at Long Bridge, on the Chickahominy. 31 

When Arnold goes into camp this night, he is between 
Steuben and Nelson and not twelve miles from either. His 
less than eight hundred men are wet, worn out, and beyond 
the control of their officers. Exertion, plunder, and rum have 
done their work on men who for nearly a month have been 
on shipboard. 

It is true that Steuben was south of the river, but there 
were boats enough at Manchester. Nelson tells us also that 
the rain damaged his powder. 

It is perhaps unfair to hope for such a feat from untrained 
soldiers, but at the same time it is interesting to speculate 
upon the crushing blow that might have been delivered on 
that “tempestuous night,” had there been previously proper 
military communication, and had the execution been in¬ 
trusted to such an officer as Light Plorse Harry Lee, or to 
such as his rival, the British Tarleton. 

On the 7th, while Arnold was approaching Westover and 
while Steuben was at Osborne’s, on the James, some priva¬ 
teers attached to Arnold’s fleet came up the Appomattox as 
far as Broadway and captured a number of tobacco-laden 
vessels. This seems to have been too much for the patience 
of the militia of the south side. Two companies of Col. 
Banister’s 33 militia, under the orders of Gen. Smallwood, 33 
attack them so fiercely that, though the militia have only 
small arms, 34 the privateers are obliged to abandon their prizes 


81 Nelson to Steuben, January 7, 1781. 

32 Banister to Bland, January, 1781. Bland Papers. 

83 Steuben to Washington, January 8, 1781. 

8 <Je£ferson to Virginia delegates in Congress, January 18, 1781. 



14 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

and proceed down the river. By the time they arrive at City 
Point, Gen. Smallwood has hastily mounted some ship guns, 34 
and they escape only after being considerably shattered, los¬ 
ing a captain and some men. 

When Arnold arrives at Westover, on the 7th, his detach¬ 
ment is in no condition for fresh enterprise. He remains 
there for three days to refresh and reestablish the troops. 
He is not disturbed. Nelson reconnoiters him from the hill 
beyond Herring Creek, but nothing of interest occurs except 
that on the night of the 8th Simcoe, sent out with forty horse¬ 
men to gain intelligence, deceives Nelson’s videttes and 
dashes into his encampment at Charles City C. H. The sud¬ 
denness of the attack and the darkness of the night, together 
with a stratagem of this bold officer, disperses the militia 
utterly. Some are wounded and a few captured, 35 while Sim¬ 
coe returns with a loss of one sergeant 36 killed, and three 
men wounded. 

Jefferson’s diary of January 7 states that there are two 
thousand two hundred and fifty men in the field. Steuben’s 
report of the following day reckons only one thousand one 
hundred and fifty, not counting the naked Continentals, who 
are sent back to Chesterfield C. H. as incompetent to take 
the field. 

The militia now begin to come in in considerable numbers, 
but there are no arms to give them. 37 This is “ rather from 
want of arrangement,” says Steuben, “than from anything 
else. Those of the State were so scattered in removing 
them on the alarm that their officers cannot collect them 
again.” 38 Gen. Nelson, however, has fifteen hundred stand, 
and only five hundred men. 39 Col. Banister 40 dwells on the 

35 Four killed and wounded. Seven or eight taken. Jefferson to Virginia 
delegates in Congress, January 18, 1781. 

36 This sergeant lies buried at Westover. 

37 On the 14th and 15th of January Jefferson suggests to Steuben and Nel¬ 
son the discharge of such militia as cannot be armed “that the law for rais¬ 
ing new levies may be enforced in the counties to which the militia shall re¬ 
turn,” and on the 29th the same subject is renewed. Jefferson’s MS. Letter 
Book, 1781. 

38 Steuben to Greene, January 11, 1781. 

S9 Steuben to Washington, January 8, 1781. 

10 Banister to Bland, January, 1781. 



i5 


Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 

same state of disorder, and St. George Tucker 41 so late as 
January 21, writes of Richmond “all is confusion there 
still!” 

On January 9 Arnold was reenforced by his delinquent 
vessels and four hundred troops, and on the 10th, at noon, he 
got under way from Westover, observed by Steuben from 
Coggin’s Point. 

It had been found impossible to repair the battery at Hood’s; 
but Sieuben, believing that the'enemy would land to recon- 
noiter it, posted Col. Clarke in ambush with three hundred 
militia and thirty horse. 

Arnold, on the other hand, having heard there was a par¬ 
ty of militia at Bland’s Mills, anchored at Fleur de Hundred 
and proposed to surprise them by a night attack. The in¬ 
fantry of the Queen’s Rangers, Col. Robinson’s Provincial 
Regiment, and the Eightieth under Col. Dundas were landed. 
The night was very dark. Almost immediately they struck 
a small picket sent forward as a decoy, and, following rapidly 
over a road hemmed in-by a thick wood, Col. Robinson’s 
regiment suddenly received a heavy fire. Though twenty 
men were killed and wounded, Robinson’s men were not 
broken, and after returning the fire, charged resolutely with 
the bayonet. The militia dispersed immediately, but Simcoe 
halted, “ seeing,” as he says, “ no probability of accomplish¬ 
ing the business he had been ordered upon.” 

Returning to Hood’s, Arnold utterly dismantled the fort, 
and, having reembarked the following morning, fell down the 
river. 

On the nth Steuben sent three hundred infantry and two 
troops of horse to Cabin Point, ordered five hundred and 
sixty south side militia, then on their march to join him, to re¬ 
enforce Gen. Nelson near Williamsburg, and halted Gen. 
Weedon at Hanover C. H., with directions to cover the iron 
works at Fredericksburg. 

On the 13th Steuben marched with seven hundred militia 
to Cabin Point, and on the 14th Arnold landed twenty-two 


41 Tucker to Banister, January 21, 1781. 



16 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

miles below at Harding’s Ferry, 42 and marched to Smithfield. 
A detachment of three hundred infantry and fifty horse were 
directed to harass his rear, under the belief that the militia 
of the lower counties under Col. Parker would oppose him 
in front. Col. Parker had retired, and nothing was accom¬ 
plished. On the 15th four hundred more militia who had 
that day joined under Gen. Lawson were sent forward for a 
similar purpose, but were likewise too late. Sending across 
Pagan Creek an advance guard on the 15th to explore the 
passage of the streams and disperse militia pickets, Arnold 
continued his march on the 16th, and on the same day was 
ferried over the Nansemond at Sleepy Hole by his own boats. 
Here he encamped that night, while Gen. Lawson, joined by 
Col. Parker, entered Smithfield. Simcoe was now sent for¬ 
ward to Portsmouth to prevent the citizens from burning that 
town, while Arnold reembarked, and landed with his whole 
force 43 at Portsmouth on the 19th. 

A council of war having unanimously determined that the 
force at his disposal was unequal to the task of dislodging 
Arnold from Portsmouth, Steuben now made disposition to 
confine the enemy to that post. 44 

Col. Parker, with the Suffolk militia, held the advance at 
Riddick’s Mills with a small picket four miles farther in his 
front. Lawson, with nine hundred infantry and a troop of 
state horse, was posted at McMay’s Mills, four miles from 
Smithfield, with a small detachment at Suffolk. There were 
pickets along the Nansemond river, and Gen. Muhlenberg, 
commanding the whole, lay in reserve at Cabin Point with 
eight hundred infantry and Armand’s Legion. On the 
other side of the river Nelson, with one thousand infantry 


42 Near Cobham. 

43 Arnold’s naval force consisted of the Charon, forty-four guns, Commo¬ 
dore (Captain) Symonds, the Amphitrite, Iris, Thames, and Charlestown, 
frigates, the Forrey, twenty guns, two sloops of war, a privateer ship, and 
two brigs. 

44 Jefferson says there were about three thousand seven hundred militia 
embodied on January 18, 19. This total includes the detachment under Gen. 
Weeden near Fredericksburg. MS. Letter Book, 1781. 



Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 17 

and some volunteer horse, guarded the country from Wil¬ 
liamsburg to Newport News. 

Having made these dispositions, Steuben returned to Rich¬ 
mond to resume his duties in supplying Greene’s army, and 
in following him thither we shall learn something of the em¬ 
barrassments of the Executive. 

Mr. Jefferson can never be charged with lack of industry. 
His active mind ranges every department of affairs. Per¬ 
haps the multitude of his responsibilities injure the quality of 
the performance of his higher functions. Certainly in no 
well-ordered government would such details be expected 
from the chief magistrate. His voluminous correspondence 
ranges from a pressing search for “ pack thread” and “one 
good blacksmith (a white man)” to diplomatic correspond¬ 
ence with the French Minister, Congress, the Commander 
in Chief, and state and foreign governments. 

Intelligence is always difficult for him to obtain. On the 
15th he has not been able to locate the enemy for four days, 45 
and remembering the good offices of Mr. Jacob Wray, 46 he 
writes to him again, urging him to use the line of expresses 
from Hampton, somewhat naively adding that two days were 
lost in the late incursion, “ which would have added so much 
to the collection of militia in this quarter as to have rendered 
doubtful at least whether the enemy could have got here.” 

Nobody more than Jefferson appreciated the paramount 
importance of holding up the hands of Greene in the Caro- 
linas. Yet he could not bring himself to execute the draft 
law in those counties whose militia was in the field. He 
writes to Steuben urging the release of all militia not actual¬ 
ly needed on the ground that “ if this incursion should much 
longer postpone the execution of the late law for raising new 
levies, it will be among its worst effects.” 47 

Pie not only has in charge the preparation of plans 48 for re¬ 
building the foundry, etc., at Westham, but finds it necessa- 


45 Jefferson to Nelson, January 15, 1781. 
^Jefferson to Jacob Wray, January 15, 1781. 
47 Jefferson to Steuben, January 13, 14, 1781. 
48 Jefferson to Senf, January 13, 1781. 

2 



18 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

ry to make an appeal to “ gentlemen of public spirit” 49 to 
send their mechanics to labor on the work. 

He is engaged in a controversy with Gov. Lee, 50 of Mary¬ 
land, as to which State shall support the prisoners of the Sara¬ 
toga Convention, and as to the disposition of the specific 
quotas of Virginia under the Continental requisition of No¬ 
vember i, 1780, which he elaborately discusses. At the same 
time he writes to the Continental quartermaster that he has 
“sent to Fredericksburg for camp kettles.” 51 

On the 16th of January Jefferson gives direction for the 
building of certain portable flat-bottomed boats that Wash¬ 
ington had suggested to him on November 8 for the use of 
the Virginia Army of Observation in crossing the numerous 
streams of Virginia. This delay is attributable to the fact 
that Mr. Jefferson differed with Gen. Washington as to the 
military utility of these craft, and not to procrastination. 52 

The militia are always giving trouble. As late as Februa¬ 
ry 2 only one-third of the counties had made any returns at 
all, 53 though the proper execution of the draft law was de¬ 
pendent on an accurate statement from each county. 

There is also a bitter controversy with the enemy as to the 
status of individuals capable of being paroled, which brings 
forth, a proclamation from the Governor dated January 19, 
and a letter to Nelson dated January 25 directing that General 
to hang an equal number of British prisoners, should the 
enemy hang individuals who had broken the paroles declared 
by the proclamation to be ineffective. 

Finally, there is not a dollar, even of paper money, left in 
the treasury, and on January 23 the Legislature is summoned 
to convene on the first day of March. 

With the establishment of Arnold at Portsmouth the cam¬ 
paign in Virginia may be properly said to have opened. 
Whatever military objects may have been accomplished by 


49 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, January 15, 1781. 
60 Jefferson to Lee, January 15, 1781. 

51 Je£ferson to Carrington, January 16, 1781. 
52 Jefferson to Maxwell, January 16, 1781. 
63 Jefferson to Col. John Syme, February 2, 1781. 



Arnold’s Invasion of Virginia. 19 

the raid to Richmond, there had hitherto been no combat¬ 
ants. The small body of British marched as they would, 
through an unprepared and defenseless people. Resistance 
now began to take definite form. The struggle waxed in 
interest, gradually drawing in all the principal characters on 
both sides and culminating at Yorktown. 

The Virginians essayed two objects: to confine and cap¬ 
ture Arnold and to detain Cornwallis in the Carolinas, thus 
playing into the hands of the British strategists, whose sole 
aim in sending Arnold was to divert the force of Virginia 
from being directed upon Cornwallis. Without military 
equipment and dependent upon shifting militia, they failed 
in both. Later, when both sides had been largely reen¬ 
forced, success came with naval superiority, as must always 
happen when Virginia is the battle ground. 

However interesting to the local historian, it is unnecessa¬ 
ry to describe in detail the movements about Portsmouth 
during the two months succeeding the occupation of that 
town. Muhlenberg, on the north, and Gregory, with the 
North Carolina militia on the south, constantly sought to 
limit the enemy to their works. Besides fortifying the post 
and foraging the surrounding country, Arnold kept ever in 
mind the main object of his expedition: to aid the operations 
of Cornwallis by engaging the resources of Virginia within 
her own borders. 54 In this he was so successful that not a 
single Continental or militiaman left the State until the end 
of February, 55 while the resources of the State, the temper 
of the inhabitants, and military stores of all kinds, destined 
for the main army, were consumed or wasted by changing 
bodies of militia. As Richard Henry Lee 56 wrote to Bland, 
“ thus the enemy may destroy the concert by playing inter¬ 
ludes.’ ’ With a coolness due doubtless to acquaintance with 
the militia system, Arnold planned, with a detachment of 
five hundred men, to enter by Currituck Inlet and sweep the 
North Carolina Sounds from the Chowan to the Neuse, de- 


64 For effects of Arnold’s raid see Germain to Clinton, March 7, 1781. 
^Kapp’s “Life of Steuben,” p. 402. 

66 Bland Papers, II., 58. 



20 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

stroying the shipping and distracting the militia of that State, 
and, with the assistance of a frigate at Ocracoke Inlet, to 
cut of the thin stream of foreign supplies that still filtered 
into Virginia by way of the Blackwater and South Quay. 57 
Later he actually detached five hundred men to pass up 
James River 58 and operate in favor of Cornwallis, erroneous¬ 
ly supposed to have already crossed the Dan. 

The American plans of offensive action ranged in impor¬ 
tance from Mr. Jefferson’s scheme of secret abduction to 
the elaborate combination of Gen. Washington, involving all 
the elements of the Yorktown strategy, but failing where 
the later plan succeeded—in the cooperation of the French 
fleet. 

Early in January a certain Captain Joel, a seafaring man, 
disclosed to Mr. Jefferson the brilliant idea of destroying 
Arnold’s fleet with a fire ship. After some debate his bffer 
was accepted, his vessel was equipped and appropriately 
named “ The Dragon.” Fortunately for Mr. Jefferson’s 
credit in naval warfare, as no diversion or assistance by land 
or sea seems to have been planned in aid of the “Dragon,” 
this scheme was abandoned in February, “its purpose be¬ 
ing supposed to be known by the enemy,” as Mr. Jefferson 
says in one of his letters. 59 

To us who for four generations have intuitively understood 
Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot to be terms synon} T mous 
with unspeakable baseness, small change of focus is necessary 
to comprehend our forefathers’ contempt for the historic char¬ 
acter. Mr. Jefferson’s well-known letter of January3i ’toGen. 
Muhlenberg, 60 outlining a plan and offering 5,000 guineas 
for his abduction, does, however, throw a curious light upon 
contemporary passion. That a philosophic statesman such 
as Jefferson should have taken such measures for the pun¬ 
ishment of a crime elevates the criminal to almost Satanic 
proportions, while detracting from the dignity of the Mag- 

57 Arnold to Clinton, February 13, 1781. 

68 Arnold to Clinton, March 8, 1781. 

69 Jefferson to Nelson, January 16 and February 13, 1781. 

60 Muhlenberg’s “Muhlenberg,” p. —. 



Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 21 

istracy and of Justice. The seizure of Arnold, whose ob¬ 
noxious presence had stimulated patriotic endeavor, could 
have had no beneficial effect upon the military situation, but 
such means of forcing him to face outraged justice must in 
future generations have tempered with sympathy instinctive 
horror of his crime. More blighting than sentence of court- 
martial, more salutary than physical execution is the fatidic 
judgment that left Arnold unwhipped of human justice, but 
“ pilloried in eternal shame.” To the writer of romance we 
leave the details of the execution and failure of this plot, 
more suited to his domain than to military science or sound 
policy. 

Turning from these abortive efforts, we find the campaign 
begins to assume the regularity of military superintendence. 
The entire forty-six hundred militia that Jefferson had or¬ 
dered on January 2 were never under arms at the same time. 
Nevertheless the force under Muhlenberg and the detach¬ 
ment with Clarke prevented recruiting the Continental line 
in the greater portion of the State, as the new law for that 
purpose was suspended by the Governor in all of the coun¬ 
ties that had militia in the field. Unable, therefore, to reen¬ 
force Greene and incompetent to attack Arnold, both Exec¬ 
utive and citizens saw the resources of the State being con¬ 
sumed without advancing any object, while Cornwallis's ap¬ 
proach forboded complete subjugation. 

In this distressful situation the popular mind turned to 
Washington, to Congress, to our allies, to every quarter 
whence succor might be hoped for. The absence of active 
operations at the North and the vigor of the British generals 
at the South caused discontented comparisons to be drawn. 
Men murmured that “half of the burthen of opposition” 
rested on Virginia and North Carolina. 

On February 10 Jefferson wrote to Greene 61 that “we 
must be aided by your Northern brethren,” and added, “ I 
trust you concur with us in crying aloud to Congress on this 
head.” On the 12th he hinted very strongly to the President 
of Congress and to Washington that, in his opinion, the main 


61 Jefferson to Greene, February io, 1781. MS. Letter Book. 



22 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

army could alone prevent the loss of State after State in the 
South. 62 Other influences were also at work, and unfortu¬ 
nately a plan of relief took shape without consultation with 
Washington. 

It is probable that Richard Henry Lee first set on foot the 
measure which followed. The design has been attributed 
to Jefferson, but without authority from his extant letters. 
As Washington 63 afterwards pointed out, the expedition never 
had but one possibility of success. Its inception was pecul¬ 
iarly unfortunate, in wasted effort, in disappointing hopes 
aroused in Virginia, and in fatally delaying the execution of 
a more comprehensive plan. 

On January 26 Lee wrote to Bland in Congress urging 
him to strain every nerve for naval aid. He describes Ar¬ 
nold’s force, and estimates that with the assistance of one 
ship of the line and two frigates, “the militia now in arms 
are strong enough to smother these invaders in a moment.” 64 . 

Congress urged the project upon the French Minister, who 
laid it before Des Touches, then commanding the French 
fleet in Rhode Island. Des Touches, longing to break the 
monotony of his inaction, received the suggestion at a time 
when Arbuthnot’s fleet had been shattered by a storm (Jan¬ 
uary 22), and on February 9 detached M. Le Gardeur de 
Tilly with the force indicated in Lee’s letter. Meantime 
Rochambeau reported to Washington the measures on foot 
against Arnold and added: “Nous avons beau jeu sur lui 
dans ce moment ci.” 65 

A favorable wind brought De Tilly to Lynhaven Bay 66 on 
the 13th. He arrived unannounced. No preparation had 
been made by friend or foe. Indeed, Arnold had detached 
Simcoe with four hundred men as far as Northwest Land¬ 
ing, and Jefferson did not hear of his arrival until two days 


62 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, 1781. 

63 Sparks’s Writings of Washington, VII., 411. 

64 Bland Papers, II., 58. 

^Rochambeau’s MS. Letter Book, p. 221 (February 3, 1781), Library of 
Congress. 

66 Arnold to Clinton, February 25, 1781. 



Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 23 

afterwards. 67 Col. Dabney, commanding the lower posts, er¬ 
roneously reported the arrival of the whole French fleet to 
Nelson, who, under this impression, so late as the 16th, wrote 
to Steuben: “Now is our time; not a moment ought to be 
lost.” As soon as the news was received Steuben sent an 
aid-de-camp to the French commander, and issued orders 
for active cooperation against Portsmouth. 

On the 16th Jefferson wrote to Capt. Maxwell, of the navy, 
directing certain vessels to be prepared to cooperate with the 
French fleet, and on the same day, to Maj. Claiborne to im¬ 
press boats for passing militia across James River, a need 
which Washington had foreseen early in November of the 
preceding year. On the next day one-fourth 68 of the militia 
of Loudoun, Fairfax, Prince William, and Fauquier are or¬ 
dered to Williamsburg to take the places of eight hundred 
riflemen who have been detached under Lawson to reenforce 
Gen. Greene. 

Steuben ordered Gregory’s North Carolina militia to hold 
themselves in readiness on the eastern side of the Dismal 
Swamp, and expresses were established to keep in touch with 
him. Nelson was ordered to prepare to cross the river, and 
Weedon, with eight hundred militia from about Fredericks¬ 
burg, to occupy the posts so vacated. Steuben’s biographer 
says that “ eight eighteen pounders and two mortars were got 
in readiness,” but, as Muhlenberg writes on the 24th that he 
has only two brass six pounders, and as only half so many 
eighteen pounders were even hoped for a month later, so 
great forwardness in the ordnance department is impossible. 
On the 18th Muhlenberg 69 advanced within sight of the ene¬ 
my’s lines, cut off a small picket, and defied Arnold to leave 
his works. He could not storm the works with only three 
hundred bayonets among his two thousand militia, nor could 
he attack by regular approaches with two brass six pound¬ 
ers. 70 Accordingly he retired sixteen miles, and camped at 


67 Jefferson to Washington, February 17, 1781. 

^Amounting to 1,090 men. Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, Feb, 22, 1781. 
69 Muhlenburg to Steuben, February 19, 1781. 

70 Muhlenburg to Greene, February 24, 1781. 



24 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 

Shoulder’s Hill, and on the following day De Tilly sailed for 
Newport. 

The folly of De Tilly’s expedition was the natural fruit of 
a civilian’s plan intrusted to the indiscriminating ardor of im¬ 
patient naval Frenchmen. The French admiral was in¬ 
formed of the location of Arnold, and that, by the chart, the 
draft of his own ships would not permit of his approach with¬ 
in range of the British anchorage. Knowing that the Brit¬ 
ish fleet would refit before a blockade could be successful, 
and with no plan prearranged with the land forces, it was 
useless to bring the sixty-four gun L’Eveille to Sewell’s 
Point, or to ground the Surveillante farther up the Eliz¬ 
abeth river. It was natural that the Virginian Executive and 
general officers should have striven even against military 
probabilities to cooperate with their long-wished-for ally. But 
general and clamorous discontent was the inevitable result of 
fruitless expense to the State and inconvenience to the citi¬ 
zen-militia. It seems to be a fact, however, that upon news 
of its arrival Mr. Jefferson correctly estimated the value of 
the expedition. 71 

The capture of the Romulus, of forty-four guns, sur¬ 
prised in Hampton Roads, eight other small prizes, and some 
dispatches indicating the proposed permanence of the post 
at Portsmouth, were the only ^fruits of De Tilly’s expedition. 
On the other hand, the British commander, informed of the 
movement on the 18th, and regarding the squadron only as 
an avante garde , prepared to reenforce Arnold with two 
thousand troops as soon as the admiral should be able to lo¬ 
cate the main fleet. 72 

Meantime, occupied with his own more immediate plans, 
and oppressed by the poverty of his resources, Washington’s 
mind slowly but methodically grasped the situation in Vir¬ 
ginia, and determined to take a hand there, the more will¬ 
ingly, as it is said, in the hope of capturing the traitor com¬ 
manding in the Old Dominion. 

On February 7, before receiving Rochambeau’s letter of 

7l Jefferson to Washington, February 17, 1781. 

72 Clinton to Arnold, February 18 and March 1, 1781. 



Arnold'"s Invasion of Virginia. 25 

the 3d, he wrote to that general: “If M. Des Touches has 
acquired a superiority which puts him in a position to act, 
your excellency sees as I do that this (Arnold’s) detachment 
is an object of attention.” 73 On the 15th, 74 still unaware that 
De Tilly had set off half cocked, he discussed the plan sub¬ 
mitted by Rochambeau, and pointed out that “unless the 
ships sent by M. Des Touches should happen upon Arnold 
whilst he was embarked and moving from one point to an¬ 
other, they would have little prospect of success.” Believ¬ 
ing that he might count upon the whole French fleet, he an¬ 
nounced the detachment of one thousand two hundred light 
infantry to proceed by the Head of Elk to cooperate at Ports¬ 
mouth. 

When this letter was received it was too late to follow the 
advice given, though Des Touches, 75 somewhat vaguely, 
promised to hold the remainder of his fleet in readiness to 
protect the flying squadron. When De Tilly returned, on the 
24th, the French commanders finally realized Washington’s 
sense of the importance of the operation against Arnold, and 
immediately began preparations according to his original 
plan. Of land forces Rochambeau 76 provided one thousand 
two hundred and twenty men under Baron de Viomenil, with 
four twelve pounders, four four pounders, and four mortars. 
Though Des Touches was aware that the America, re¬ 
ported lost in the storm of January 22, had returned, that 
the Bedford had been remasted, and that haste was of the es¬ 
sence of the enterprise, two full weeks were consumed in 
preparations for sea, a commentary on French seamanship 
and on the‘protection Des Touches would have been able 
to afford his squadron three weeks earlier. 77 Even after 
the fleet was reported ready, with a wind “favorable to 
them and as adverse to the enemy as Heaven could fur- 


73 Rochambeau’s MS. Letter Book, p. 225. 

74 Sparks’s Writings of Washington, VII., 411. 

76 Sparks’s Writings of Washington, VII., 424. 

76 Rochambeau’s MS. Letter Book, February 25, 1781. 

77 If refitting the Romulus caused the delay, her capture may be added to 
the evil results of De Tilly’s expedition. 



26 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

nish,” a delay of twenty-four hours settled the fate of the 
cooperation. 

Meantime letters from Jefferson 78 and Greene 79 excited 
more and more keenly the interest of Washington. By let¬ 
ters of the 22d to Des Touches, 80 and of the 26th to Rocham- 
beau, 81 he enforced the gravity of the southern situation, and 
on March 2, after receiving intelligence of Cornwallis’s 
threatened passage of the Dan, he set out to Newport to em¬ 
phasize in person the urgency of the affair. 

On February 20 Lafayette received his instructions, and, 
at Peekskill, took command of the detachment destined for 
Virginia. He set out immediately by way of Pompton, Mor¬ 
ristown, and Trenton, at which place he took water passage 
. down the Delaware. At Morristown he was joined by the 
New Hampshire line, making his force one thousand two 
hundred men in all. 82 So energetic were his movements that 
on March 3 the detachment reached the head of Elk three 
days in advance of Washington’s calculation. 

Lafayette’s instructions 83 show that Washington had al¬ 
ready been informed of De Tilly’s expedition, but trusted 
that his subsequent recommendations would be accepted, at 
least to the extent of full naval cooperation. 

Nevertheless, after learning that Des Touches’s departure 
was dependent upon, and to be arranged for after, De Tilly’s 
return, he foresaw the probability of British anticipation in 
the Chesapeake, and on February 27 ordered Lafayette “on 


78 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, February 12, 1781. • 

79 Dated “On the Dan River;” Greene’s Greene, III., 175. 

80 Sparks’s Writings of Washington, VII., 424. 

81 Rochambeau’s MS. Letter Book. 

82 The detachment was designated light infantry, and was divided into 
three regiments, as follows: First Regiment, Col. Vose, eight companies, 
Massachusetts line; Second Regiment, Lieut. Col. Gimat, two companies, 
Massachusetts line, five companies, Connecticut line, and one company, 
Rhode Island line; Third Regiment, Lieut. Col. Barber, five companies, 
New Jersey line, two companies, New Hampshire line, and one company 
of Gen. Hagen’s Regiment. At Philadelphia a battery under Col. Ebenezer 
Stevens was added. Journal of Lieut. Ebenezer Wild. Proc. Mass. Hist. 
Soc., October and November, 1890. 

83 Dated Windsor, February 20, 1781. 



Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 27 

no account to leave the Elk river until it is ascertained be¬ 
yond a doubt that our friends are below.” 84 Impatient to be 
in at the death, and dreading lest his countrymen on board 
the fleet should reap all the glory at Portsmouth, Lafayette 
disregarded the letter of this injunction. On the 9th, hav¬ 
ing at length secured transportation, he ventured to set out 
for Annapolis escorted by several small armed vessels. Here 
he left the detachment, and, accompanied by the Count de 
Charlus, son of the Minister of Marine, he proceeded down 
the bay in a small boat to enforce his demand for a more se¬ 
cure escort, and to superintend the preparations about Ports¬ 
mouth. 

This was the next to the last act in the original plan of co¬ 
operation. Two days after his landing at Yorktown on the 
14th, Arbuthnot overtook the French fleet off Cape Henlo- 
pen, and Des Touches returned to Newport after an engage¬ 
ment commonly referred to as a drawn battle, but which to¬ 
tally destroyed the hopes and plans of the allied command¬ 
ers. 

Mr. Jefferson received the first news that came to Virginia 
of the intended reenforcement from the North. Washing¬ 
ton’s letter of February 21 85 reached him seven days later, 
and forthwith new measures were set on foot for concerted 
action. In order to appreciate the embarrassments that fol¬ 
lowed it will be desirable to examine briefly the military re¬ 
sources and military organization of the State, and the de¬ 
mands that had previously been made upon both. Losses by 
previous hostile incursions, and contributions of equipments 
to the Continental line will not be regarded, though Mr. Jef¬ 
ferson attributed his present distress largely to the latter. 
Writing to Gen. Gates, on February 17, 1781, he said: “ I 
have been knocking at the door of Congress for aids of all 
kinds, but especially of arms, ever since the middle of sum¬ 
mer. The Speaker, Harrison, is gone to be heard on that 
subject. Justice, indeed, requires that we should be aided 
powerfully. Yet if they would repay us the arms we have 

84 Sparks’s Writings of Washington, VII., 440. 

85 Jefferson’s Correspondence. Randolph, I., 212. 



28 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 

lent them, we should give the enemy trouble, though aban¬ 
doned to ourselves. 86 It will be understood that Virginia had 
borne her proportion of the six years’ warfare. Occasion 
for surprise will be found, not in the fact that her resources 
were low, but in that her government had not learned to use 
and husband them better. Unsatisfactory as was the proc¬ 
ess of recruiting the Continental line, even more difficult 
was the work of equipping and arming all classes of men for 
the field. Virginia was practically dependent upon the 
Northern States and foreign countries for all kinds of man¬ 
ufactured articles. 87 Lack of clothing unfitted the recruits 
for service almost as much as lack of arms. Cloth, shoes, 
hats, and cartouche boxes had to be wrung from the scanty 
resources of Congress until the arrival of the supply which 
Franklin received from France in March. Uniforms 88 were 
of course out of the question, and a regimental coat was so 
unknown in the upper counties that the appearance of a lieu¬ 
tenant and his detail, equipped with some martial preten¬ 
sions, spread the news that the British were coming, and 
caused a temporary flight of the legislature from Staunton. 89 
Though lead, saltpeter, and sulphur were abundantly found 
within the limits of Virginia, powder and ball were always 
wanting, and the workmen at the lead mines finally con¬ 
trived to cut off the whole supply by losing the vein. 90 Im¬ 
mediately after the Richmond Convention of 1775, manufac¬ 
tories of powder, cannon, and small arms were put in oper¬ 
ation at Westham. 91 Simcoe says the foundry was a very 
complete one, but its destruction, during his January raid, 


86 Jefferson’s Correspondence. Randolph, I., 210. 

87 On February 21 Mr. Jefferson wrote to Col. Davies, in charge of the re¬ 
cruits at Chesterfield C. H., that he had on hand a large supply of deer 
skins, but nobody to dress them. These he was willing to supply if Da¬ 
vies had anybody who could make them into breeches. 

88 No uniform was prescribed for the Continental army until the General 
Orders of October 2, 1779. 

89 Narrative of My Life. Francis T. Brooke, Richmond, 1849. 

^Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, 1781. 

91 Richmond, the Capital of Virginia: Its History. John P. Little, Rich¬ 
mond, 1851, p. 26. 




2 9 


Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

left Greene’s army, as well as Virginia, dependent upon the 
gun factory 92 and the iron works of Mr. Hunter, both at Fred¬ 
ericksburg. Whatever may have been the capacity of these 
shops, it is safe to say that during this winter and spring the 
enemy captured in magazines many more muskets than their 
total output. 93 It is very possible to criticise the dispositions 
that led to these losses, and difficult to overestimate the task 
of replacing them. Even when arms could be purchased, 
transportation by water was barred by the British war ships 
and privateers, and overland, wagons were to be procured 
only by impressment. 94 As an instance of these difficulties 
and dangers the chief supply of arms (1,100 stand) received 
by Virginia during 1781 was sent out from Nantes the pre¬ 
ceding year in the ship Committee. The vessel was cap¬ 
tured by an English privateer, recaptured by an American 
privateer, brought into Providence, R. I., and one-half of the 
cargo of two thousand two hundred muskets adjudged to the 
captor. At least a year elapsed between the purchase and 
the receipt. Efforts were first made to forward them by land, 
then by the French naval expeditions of February and March. 
Finally they were forwarded overland, and as wagons were 
not to be hired they were impressed. The arms were not 
available until June, 1781. 

Beside the ill-equipped regiments with Greene 95 she had 
no Continentals in the field. A return of the so-called State 
Establishment, dated February 6, shows: 96 

First State Regiment, 192 noncommissioned officers and privates. 

Second State Regiment, 30 noncommissioned officers and privates. 

State Garrison Regiment, 176 noncommissioned officers and privates. 

State Artillery Regiment, no more than will form one company (serving 
with Greene). 

About two hundred of these had been ordered to join 

82 The gun factory was conducted by Col. Dick. Journal of the Council, 
1781, February 7. 

8S See losses at Richmond, Petersburg, Point of Fork, Charlottesville, etc. 

84 Luzerne tq Des Touches, January 2, 1781, and Letter of Samuel Night¬ 
ingale, dated Providence, December 6, 1780. Bland Papers, II., 30 and 39. 
Jefferson to Washington, May 28, 1781. Correspondence, I., 222. 

85 Under Col. Greene and Col. Hawes. 

86 Journal of Council, p. 33. 



30 


Arnold's Invasion of Virginia . 

Clarke’s expedition to the Northwest, on account of the re¬ 
fusal of the militia of Berkeley and Frederick to accompany 
that officer. The remainder formed a scarecrow battalion 
guarding the prisoners of war. 

Though the act for recruiting this State’s quota of troops 
to serve in the Continental army 97 had been repeatedly 
amended, and debated by the assembly for a full month, its 
provisions were so lacking in vigor and directness as practi¬ 
cally to defeat its declared purpose. No draft could take 
place under sixty days, and in many cases at least ninety 
daj^s must have expired before the eighteen months recruit 
could reach the rendezvous. It was so vicious in its bounty 
system that a recruiting officer declared it would “ produce 
two deserters for one soldier.” 98 Though its theoretical basis 
was a complete return of the State militia, several weeks after 
its passage Mr. Jefferson, in a circular letter to the county 
lieutenants, observes that “ notwithstanding the requisition I 
made you six months ago for a return of your militia, you 
have not been pleased to comply with it.” 99 He constantly 
repeats this demand until the end of February, 1780. 100 The 
substitute system, and the criminal provisions of law that 
required the arrest, trial, conviction, and sentence of de¬ 
linquent militiamen and others, to serve a term in the line, 
utterly destroyed its morale and brought the honorable call¬ 
ing of the soldier into disfame. Great numbers of people 
were tired of war, and their sentiments added to the inherent 
futility of the act. The back counties would have none of 
it, and “Augusta and Rockbridge have prevented it by 
force.” 101 Children and dwarfs, according to Steuben, were 
forwarded to the rendezvous, and on March 5 the Governor 
laid before the General Assembly a letter from that general 
declining to receive certain recruits as totally unfit for serv- 


97 10 Hening, 326. Introduced bj Mr. Starke, November 27, 1780. Passed 
December 28, 1780. Journal of the House of Delegates, 1780. 

98 Davies to Steuben, March 10. Steuben’s MS. Papers, Vol. VI. 
"Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, January 19, 1781. 
ioojefferson to Steuben, January 19, 1781. 

101 Davies to Steuben, May 24. Steuben’s MS. Papers, Vol. VIII. 



3 i 


Arnold ’s Invasion of Virginia. 

ice. 102 Finally, at the middle of May, only one hundred and 
fifty recruits were provided with arms, 103 and by the end of 
that month five hundred and fifty in all of the three thousand 
required by the Act had been collected. 104 

It is true that the execution of the Act for recruiting was 
suspended by the executive in those Counties whose militia 
had been called into service—a tenderness for the people 
that evinces the responsiveness of a democratic government 
rather than appreciation of the military crisis. Yet not more 
than one-twelfth of the militia were ever in the field, while 
little more than one-sixth of the Continental quota was being 
recruited. Mr. Jefferson correctly regarded this interrup¬ 
tion of recruiting as among the worst consequences of Ar¬ 
nold’s invasion, but the proportion above indicated between 
the militia in service and the deficiency in the quota tends to 
confirm the preceding reflections upon the system. 

It must be borne in mind that none of the Virginia Conti¬ 
nental line recruited during 1781 were ever available for serv¬ 
ice outside of the State until active operations in Virginia had 
ceased with the capitulation of Yorktown. The regiment of 
Col. Greene, dispatched in December, 1780, and a detach¬ 
ment of four hundred men under Lieut. Col. Campbell that 
left Chesterfield C. H. on February 25 following, both re¬ 
cruited during the preceding year, were the only reenforce¬ 
ments that Steuben found it possible to forward to the south¬ 
ern army, though the original object of his command in Vir¬ 
ginia had been the organization of her Continental quota in 
support of Gen. Greene. 105 

Returning now to the demands upon the Virginia militia, 
a brief summary of events will enable us to resume the con¬ 
tinuous narrative of the campaign where it was interrupted 
on the first arrival of Lafayette in Virginia. 

Forbearing further reference to the detachment under 
George Rogers Clarke (as only indirectly connected with 


102 Jefferson to the Speaker of the House of Delegates. MS. Letter Book. 
103 Steuben to Greene, May 15. Greene MS. Papers. 

104 Steuben to Lafayette, May 20. Steuben’s MS. Papers, Vol. VIII. 
105 Kapps’s Steuben, pp. 402, 403. 



32 Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

the purpose of this paper), we left Gen. Muhlenberg and 
about three thousand seven hundred militia endeavoring to re¬ 
strain Arnold at Portsmouth. There was also a small detach¬ 
ment serving with Gen. Greene, but their three months’ term 
of enlistment expiring with the end of January, notwithstand¬ 
ing the critical situation of affairs in that quarter, they even 
refuse to escort the Cowpens prisoners to a place of safety, 
and force Gen. Stevens to march them homeward as rapid¬ 
ly as possible in order to save their arms from being dis¬ 
persed. 106 Retiring with a mere handful of men, before Corn¬ 
wallis’s rapid advance, Greene crossed the Dan river on 
February 14. The news of his helpless situation was exag¬ 
gerated by reports that Cornwallis had also crossed that river 
with five thousand men and was in march toward Peters¬ 
burg. 107 Jefferson issues orders with promptness, and the 
militia respond with more alacrity than common. Upon the 
first news he proposes to send reenforcements of two thou¬ 
sand seven hundred and sixty-four men. 108 On the 15th Col. 
C. Lynch is requested to raise volunteers in Bedford. 108 On 
the same day circular letters to the county lieutenants of 
Washington, Montgomery, and Botetourt call for five hun¬ 
dred riflemen, and Pittsylvania and Henry are required to 
furnish four hundred and eighty militiamen—“ the latter will 
want arms.” 108 The four hundred regulars at Chesterfield 
C. H. received definite orders to march, and eight hundred 
riflemen from Rockbridge, Augusta, Rockingham, and Shen¬ 
andoah, already embodied under Muhlenberg, are designed 
to proceed under Lawson, “if they can be induced to go 
willingly.” 108 On the 17th Jefferson sends Greene full pow¬ 
ers to call militia into service, and advises the Charlotte mili¬ 
tia, under Col. T. Read, to support that general. The very 
interesting situation at Portsmouth, and the detachment of 
the riflemen caused Steuben to recommend a further re- 

106 Girardin, History of Virginia (Burk’s, Vol. IV.), and Stevens’s letters 
of January 24 and February 8, pp. 477-479. They were disbanded at Pitt¬ 
sylvania C. H. 

107 Arnold to Clinton, February 25, 1781. Clinton-Cornwallis Contro¬ 
versy. 

108 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, 1781. 



33 


Arnold’s Invasion of Virginia . 

enforcement to Muhlenburg, which, as has been already 
stated, was ordered from Loudon, Fairfax, Prince William, 
and Fauquier. 109 On the 18th Cornwallis is reported to have 
reached Boyd's Ferry, and Lunenburg, Amelia, Powhatan, 
Cumberland, and Brunswick are ordered to send to that point 
all the men they can arm, while Dinwiddie and Chesterfield 
are to embody and wait further orders at Watkins’s mill. 108 
On the same day the prisoner troops of convention 110 are or¬ 
dered up the valley, “keeping below the Blue Ridge,” and 
Maj. McGill directed to proceed to Greene’s headquarters 
and by means of a line of expresses from thence to Rich¬ 
mond keep the Executive informed of the movements of both 
armies, and the calls to be made on Virginia. * * 111 

The first reports from the militia were very flattering. The 
spirit of opposition among the people, stimulated by the pub¬ 
lic prints, 112 was universal, and the number embodied was 
said to be limited only by the supply of arms. 113 The North 
Carolina militia were also rallying under Gens. Eaton and But¬ 
ler. The retirement of Cornwallis to Hillsborough was gen¬ 
erally regarded as due to a wholesome fear of their prowess. 
It is difficult to say precisely what was the total strength of 
the Virginian militia under Stevens and Lawson at the battle 
of Guildford. Five days before the battle Greene had be¬ 
tween eight and nine hundred, only thirty of whom were 
Carolinians, and he wrote to Jefferson that, though near five 
thousand have been in motion for the past few weeks, they 
came and went so irregularly that he could make no calcu¬ 
lation on the strength of his army. 114 Of the two thousand 
seven hundred and fifty-three militia officially reported as 

109 Amounting to 1,090 men. Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, February 22, 
1781, ante p. 23. 

110 Col Wood, commanding the guard, is informed on the 21st: “The 
meeting of the Assembly on Thursday sennight is relied on to furnish us 
with money, of which we have not at present one shilling.” 

111 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, 1781. 

112u if our countrymen turn out with spirit, the capture of Lord Cornwal¬ 
lis’s army is inevitable as fate, and will close the 6cene of the southern 
war.” Virginia Gazette , February 17, 1781. 

113 Jefferson to Washington, February 26. MS. Letter Book, 1781. 

114 Greene to Jefferson, May 10. Greene MSS. quoted by Girardin, p. 482- 

3 



34 


Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 

present at Guilford (March 15), it is probable that consid¬ 
erably more than one-half were Virginians. 116 Their enthu¬ 
siasm, however, was short-lived. On March 19 Jefferson 
wrote: 116 “I find that we have deceived ourselves not a little 
by counting on the whole numbers of militia which have been 
in motion as if they had all remained with Gen. Greene, 
when in fact they seem only to have visited and quitted him.” 
Greene hastened to report the fact, and to represent the ne¬ 
cessity of fresh support. The defection was doubly unfor¬ 
tunate, as every energy was being called into play to cooper¬ 
ate with the French and Lafayette about Portsmouth. Steu¬ 
ben advised the detachment of two thousand men from Muh¬ 
lenberg's command, and ably defended his plan, 117 but upon 
the arrival of Phillips with a British reenforcement he was 
overruled by the Council. 118 Such a counter stroke was in 
accordance with the Napoleonic maxim and the practice of 
Robert Lee, and if conducted by an officer such as Stone¬ 
wall Jackson would have infallibly drawn the British forces 
in Virginia to the Carolinas. On March 29 two thousand 
two hundred and fifty-three militia from practically the same 
counties as on the former call were ordered to the southward, 
but Mr. Jefferson writes to Greene that the new militia can¬ 
not reach him before the former retire. 119 Thus the resources 
of the State are dissipated, both Greene and Steuben are 


115 Girardin (Burk, IV., 482) gives the following estimate of the Virginian 
militia at the battle of Guildford: From Muhlenberg’s command (Lawson), 
500; from Pittsylvania and Henry (Stevens), ?; from Montgomery and Bo¬ 
tetourt (Preston), 300; from Washington County (Campbell), 60; from Bed¬ 
ford County (Lynch), 300. Total, 1,160 plus Stevens’s Brigade. Jefferson 
(MS. Letter Book, 1781, March 8), from reports of McGill and others, gives 
the following estimate of the Virginian militia at the battle of Guildford: 
From Muhlenberg’s command (Lawson), 1,000 (stated to be probably exag¬ 
gerated); from Pittsylvania and Henry (Stevens), 700 (only 480 were called); 
from Montgomery and Bottetourt (Preston), 400; from Washington Coun¬ 
ty (Campbell), 600; from Bedford County (Lynch), 300. Total, 3,000. 

116 Jefferson to President of Congress and Gen. Washington, MS. Letter 
Book, 1781. 

117 Kapps’s Steuben, p. 415. 

118 MS. Journal of the Council, 1781, p. 101. 

119 Je£ferson to Greene, MS. Letter’Book, March 29 and April 1, 1781. 



Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 35 

crippled, and several hundred more patriots retire upon the 
budding laurels of a two months’ enlistment. 

Meanwhile the rigors of a winter campaign, more trying 
to the undisciplined soldier 120 than the fury of a pitched bat¬ 
tle, is telling upon the militia called out in January to oppose 
Arnold. Badly clothed, ill-fed, without tents, and with 
scantiest provision for the sick, desertion becomes rife, and 
the utmost exertions of government are required to keep a 
force in the field. From beyond the Dismal Swamp, about 
the middle of February, Mr. Loyall reported that four hun¬ 
dred militia of Princess Anne and Norfolk embodied at North¬ 
west Bridge were so dispirited from lack of communication 
with the main army as to contemplate laying down their 
arms. 121 This temper is not confined to Princess Anne and 
Norfolk, whose situation, among many loyalists and peculiar¬ 
ly exposed to the activity of the partisan Simcoe, was more 
distressing than that of their compatriots. On February 24 
Jefferson writes to Steuben that the nakedness of the militia 
at Williamsburg has almost produced a mutiny, and adds: 
“You will judge from the temper of these militia how little 
prospect there is of your availing yourself of their aid on the 
south side of the river, should you require it.” 123 Inability to 
coerce, forces upon the executive the pernicious device of 
calling upon the neighboring militia for temporary service. 
Accordingly on the 24th the county lieutenants of James 
City, York, Warwick, Elizabeth City, and City of Williams¬ 
burg are directed to take the places of the recalcitrants until 
the arrival of the musters from the Potomac counties, called 
out the preceding week. 123 During all of the last week in 
February both Arnold and the Virginians continue to be un¬ 
certain as to what may be expected from the French squad- 

120 “In battle the ardor of youth often appears to shame the cool indiffer¬ 
ence of the old soldier; but when the strife is between the malice of fortune 
and fortitude, between human endurance and accumulating hardships, the 
veteran becomes truly formidable, when the young soldier resigns himself 
to despair.” Napier’s Peninsular War, Book I., pp. 89, 90. 

121 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, February 17, 1781. 

122 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, February 24, 1781. 

123 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, February 24, 1781. 



/ 

Arnold's Invasion of Virginia. 


77 



36 


ron of De Tilly. On the 21st Jefferson, believing that the 
fleet is on a temporary cruise, directs Nelson to continue the 
preparations against Portsmouth, 124 and on the 26th reports to 
Washington that Muhlenberg has closed up around Ports¬ 
mouth, because the French fleet has relieved him of the ap¬ 
prehension that Arnold’s shipping might take him in the rear 
by way of the Nansemond river. 126 Mr. Jefferson received 
on February 28 the news of the detachment of Lafayette 
from the main army to Virginia. During the remainder of 
the campaign, though interrupted by the confirmation of Des 
Touches’s failure, and diverted by the incursions of Phillips 
and Cornwallis, practically the whole strength of Virginia 
was devoted to cooperation in the general plan laid down by 
Washington in his instructions to Lafayette dated at New 
Windsor February 20. Though the accomplishment of this 
plan was delayed for six months, and the scene shifted from 
Portsmouth to Yorktown, the postponement of fruition led, 
through means originally unhoped for, and through the dis¬ 
appointment of other and equally cherished plans, to the re¬ 
sult that the forces of Arnold, Phillips, Leslie, and Corhwal- 
lis were finally ensnared in the trap that had originally been 
laid for Arnold alone. 126 The arrival of the British reenforce¬ 
ments under Phillips, the junction of the forces of that gen¬ 
eral with Cornwallis in the face of Lafayette at Petersburg, 
the successful marches and countermarches of that young 
officer toward and from the head waters of the James, the 
cooperative movements of the French land and naval forces, 
and the culmination of the campaign at Yorktown in the fol¬ 
lowing October, furnish material for separate chapters in the 
history of a memorable year. 

124 Jefferson’s MS^ Letter Book, February 21, 1781. 

126 Jefferson’s MS. Letter Book, February 26, 781. 

126 It is of course known that Arnold was superseded by the arrival of 
Maj. Gen. Phillips in the Chesapeake, March 26, 1781. By letter of March 
24, Clinton had directed Phillips to send Arnold to New York, “if you 
should not have particular occasion for his services.” This letter was re¬ 
ceived by Cornwallis May 20, after the death of Phillips, and on May 26 
Cornwallis writes Clinton that he has “consented to the request of Brig. 
Gen. Arnold to go to New York.” 












































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